
# Revolutionary Navy Cuba



The Cuban *Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria* (MGR) is a coastal defense [force](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##). However, the range of its missile boats and the narrow waters around Cuba make it formidable to an opponent who has not established air superiority. The missile boats are the Osa-I and II and Komar class, with a range of 800 nautical miles at 25 knots and 400 nautical miles at 30 knots respectively. They are armed with the Styx missile, which has a range of 18 miles and carries a 1100-pound conventional warhead.

In the early 1980s Cuba had a small, capable [navy](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##) that is being expanded and modernized. Two recently acquired Foxtrot class submarines were well manned and capably handled, and Castro was expected to receive more of them in the near future. Cuba’s single Koni class frigate could operate effectively throughout the Caribbean Basin; it was the nucleus of a blue-water capability. Nearly two dozen Osa and Komar missile attack boats armed with the SS-N-2 Styx ship-to-ship missile and recently acquired Turya hydrofoil torpedo boats represented a significant wartime threat to [military](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##) and civilian shipping throughout the Southern United States coastal area.

By 1997 the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that the Cuban was drawing down its blue-water capability and was becoming a coastal-defense force. The last of two Russian Koni-class frigates arrived in April 1997 at the Cienfuegos Naval Base, the site for scrapping vessels that are obsolete or not operational through disrepair. The sole anti-submarine [warfare](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##) vessel, a Russian Pauk II ship, was also is at the site awaiting possible scrapping. Of the three submarines in the inventory, none were operational as of 1997. The Osa-class patrol boats, equipped with Styx [anti-ship] missiles continue to deteriorate because they are not being maintained. The Osa boats are Cuba's last remaining water-based, anti-ship missile platforms.

The 1997 the Defense Intelligence Agency report noted that Russian-made SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles had been taken off some coastal-patrol boats and adapted for shore batteries equipped with Cuban-built Bandera VI mobile launchers. Styx-equipped Bandera had been spotted by US intelligence at shore batteries near Havana, to provide coverage of ships near one of the few landing beaches where Havana anticipates hostile amphibious landings. Styx-equipped Bandera were also deployed to the Nicaro Naval Base in eastern Cuba, where they could threaten US ships entering the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The mobile ground-based Bandera VI can deploy to provide coastal coverage for defensive positions throughout eastern Cuba.

The Navy has no capability to sustain operations beyond its territorial waters and focuses on defense of the Cuban coast. Cuba no longer has any functioning submarines in its inventory. Perhaps a little over a dozen of its remaining surface vessels are combat capable. The Navy retains a weak anti-surface warfare capability using fast attack boats that carry STYX surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles. The Navy also retains an extremely weak antisubmarine warfare capability. The Cuban Navy can pose a more substantial threat to undefended civilian vessels.

In the opening months of 2003, there were numerous attempts to hijack [aircraft](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##) and ocean-going vessels by Cubans seeking to depart from Cuba. In several cases, these attempts involved the use of weapons by the hijackers. Cuban authorities attempted to resolve these incidents peacefully, but they were not able to do so successfully in all cases. U.S. [citizens](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/navy.htm##), although not necessarily targets, may be caught up in any violence during an attempted hijacking. Accordingly, U.S. citizens may wish to avoid travel by public transportation within Cuba.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Warships** | | | | | | | |
| **SYSTEM** | | **Inventory** | | | | | |
| **Class** | **Source** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2002** | **2005** | **2010** |
| FIRGATES | | 2 | 2 | 0 | – | – | – |
| Koni | [Russian] | 2 | 2 | 0 | – | – | – |
| SUBMARINES | | 2 | 1 | 0 | – | – | – |
| Foxtrot | [Russian] | 2 | 1 | 0 | – | – | – |
| PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS | | – | – | 5 | – | – | – |
| Osa II | [Russian] | – | – | 4 | – | – | – |
| Pauk II | [Russian] | – | – | 1 | – | – | – |
| MINE COUNTERMEASURES | | – | – | 6 | – | – | – |
| Sonya | [Russian Mine Sweeper Coastal] | – | – | 2 | – | – | – |
| Yevgenya | [Russian Mine Sweeper Inshore] | – | – | 4 | – | – | – |
| AMPHIBIOUS | | – | – | 1 | – | – | – |
| Polnocny LSM | [Russian] | – | – | 1 | – | – | – |
| SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS | | – | – | 1 | – | – | – |
| Intelligence Collection Vessel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |